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MARKET ORGANISATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA 
AND ENGLAND: VALUATION IN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY
SARAH PATERSON*
I. THE DEBATE
This paper is about the valuation of a financially distressed business for 
the purpose of determining the allocation of equity in exchange for existing 
debt claims in a large corporate debt restructuring. In the United States, if a 
company in chapter 11 is proposing to exchange debt for equity, a body of 
common law precedent has developed to establish how the enterprise is to 
be valued in deciding which creditors should receive equity, and in which 
proportions. Crucially, the Supreme Court has discouraged bankruptcy 
courts from reaching decisions on value based on exposure to the market.1
Typically, each group of creditors is mandated to receive equity in exchange 
for debt, and the existing shareholders appoint professional valuers to value 
the enterprise based on traditional valuation techniques, of which the most 
important is probably the discounted cash flow, or DCF, method.2 Each of 
the valuation experts puts forward her opinion on value, and the bankruptcy 
judge ultimately decides between the views expressed.
In England, debt restructuring via a court process to achieve a debt-for-
equity swap is, for reasons discussed later in this paper, a more recent phe-
nomenon. To the extent that it has occurred, the English courts have tended 
to determine whether to approve the allocation of equity in the debt restruc-
turing by reference to the amounts that creditors would have received if no 
restructuring had been agreed. The company has argued that either the busi-
ness will be sold by an insolvency practitioner as a going concern, or that it 
will be broken up and the assets sold separately by an insolvency practi-
tioner. Typically, some evidence of exposure of the business and assets to 
the market will be submitted to identify the value which would be achieved 
in the relevant “counterfactual scenario.”
* Associate Professor of Law, the London School of Economics and Political Science.
1. Kerry O’Rourke, Valuation Uncertainty in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 403, 425.
2. E.W. (Sandy) Purcell, Distressed Valuation, 6 INT’L CORP. RESCUE 17, 18–20 (2009).
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The author has already written extensively about the debate surrounding 
which of these two approaches is to be preferred, considering the theoretical 
roots of each approach and the influence which each could have on the mar-
ket for credit for healthy companies in the economy.3 However, this paper 
takes a different approach. In an influential piece in 2006, Baird and Bern-
stein highlighted the way in which the uncertainty posed by valuation litiga-
tion in chapter 11 was designed to encourage consensual bargaining between 
the parties.4 This paper argues that this was indeed the case in the historical 
roots of what we might call the “bargaining and litigation” model in the 
United States and remained the case when chapter 11 was introduced in the 
1970s. However, it argues that changes in the institutional environment mean 
that it is no longer the case, with implications for reform in America and 
England.
This is particularly relevant at the present time. In England, the Insol-
vency Service launched a review of the corporate insolvency framework in 
the United Kingdom in 2016 (and has published many of the responses which 
it received to the consultation),5 and the European Commission has pub-
lished a proposal for a new directive setting minimum harmonisation stand-
ards for restructuring law.6 Both the consultation and the proposal consider 
the possibility of introducing new tools into the legislative scheme to imple-
ment a debt restructuring, and both ponder the question of which approach 
to valuation should be adopted. In particular, the European Commission pro-
posal seems to contemplate adopting the U.S. approach. At the same time, 
the American Bankruptcy Institute Commission to Study Reform of Chapter 
11 has suggested reforms to the approach to valuation which appear to rein-
force the commitment to bargaining and litigation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Part II traces the main contours of sig-
nificant organisational change in the finance market in America and Eng-
land, and the impact on debt restructuring. Part III identifies the 
3. See generally Sarah Paterson, The Adaptive Capacity of Markets and Convergence in Law: UK 
High Yield Issuers, US Investors and Insolvency Law, 78 MOD. L. REV. 431 (2015); Sarah Paterson, Re-
thinking Corporate Bankruptcy Law in the Twenty-First Century, 36 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 697 (2015); 
Sarah Paterson, Debt Restructuring and Notions of Fairness, 80 MOD. L. REV. 600 (2017).
4. Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the 
Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930, 1968 (2006).
5. THE INSOLVENCY SERVICE, A REVIEW OF THE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY FRAMEWORK: A
CONSULTATION ON OPTIONS FOR REFORM, (2016) (U.K.), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys-
tem/uploads/attachment_data/file/525523/A_Review_of_the_Corporate_Insolvency_Framework.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R8LM-JNSW].
6. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Pre-
ventative Restructuring Frameworks, Second Chance and Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Restruc-
turing, Insolvency and Discharge Procedures and Amending Directive 2012/30/EU, at 5–6, COM (2016) 
723 final (Nov. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Commission Proposal].
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consequences for what the paper calls the “institutional order,” used here in 
the sense in which the institutional economists use it as including formal 
rules (law) and informal norms of behaviour which influence market organ-
isation and affect corporate bankruptcy outcomes.7 The paper argues that the 
changes in organisational and institutional structure have fundamentally al-
tered the incentives to bargain which are otherwise provided by the valuation 
approach in chapter 11, and that as a result there may be both a case for 
reform in the United States, and a case for adopting a different approach in 
England and Europe. Part IV puts forward a tentative proposal for a different 
approach in which bargaining is mandated and evidenced. The paper then 
concludes.
II. ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE IN THE FINANCE MARKET
Restructuring the debts of large corporates with complex capital struc-
tures gets its start in both England and America in the great age of railway 
construction in the nineteenth century. However, the emerging organisa-
tional structure of finance differed markedly between the two jurisdictions, 
and this was to have significant implications for the evolution of debt re-
structuring practice. The first crucial difference is the sources of capital and 
the ways in which they were intermediated. Before the development of re-
gional securities markets in England, so-called railway projectors typically 
retained local solicitors to connect them with local potential investors.8
These local solicitors also acted as intermediaries between the railway pro-
jectors and the landed classes over whose land the railway needed to be 
built.9 As nascent securities markets began to develop in England, lawyers 
played a crucial role in establishing the railway companies for investment 
and, later, lent their names to efforts by so-called company promoters to raise 
capital. Two things are particularly crucial about this early organisation of 
the market. First, the local solicitor was heavily involved in efforts to raise 
capital but was not involved in looking after the interests of investors after 
the capital was invested. Secondly, the capital was raised largely from do-
mestic investors: provincial merchants, farmers and local gentleman who 
were known to, and approached by, the local solicitor lending his name to 
the capital raising.
7. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 121, 133, 170
(2005).
8. R.W. KOSTAL, LAW AND ENGLISH RAILWAY CAPITALISM 1825–1875, at 16 (1994).
9. Id.
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Both the sources of capital, and the way in which capital raising was 
intermediated, took a very different path in America. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, America was firmly a debtor nation: raising capital for significant de-
velopment, including the construction of railway infrastructure, from 
overseas investors, notably English investors.10 Nonetheless, raising English 
capital raised a number of significant challenges: default by American states 
on their debts somewhat damaged America in the eyes of her potential Eng-
lish investing class,11 and the appetite of London investors varied with the 
fortunes of American harvests and war.12 There was no well-respected, local 
solicitor in a neighbouring town to lend his name to the promotion effort, 
but, as in England, financial markets were undeveloped. Into this fray 
stepped the early American investment bankers, most notably J.P. Morgan. 
Yet the first crucial difference between the American investment banker and 
the English local solicitor was that the former did not confine his role to the 
raising of capital but saw it as a crucial part of his role to monitor the business 
after investment and, as we shall see, if necessary to step in after default. In 
the words of Ron Chernow, the American investment banker transitioned 
from “a passive figure issuing shares for companies to a strong, active force 
in managing their affairs.”13 And the capital, of course, was raised not from 
domestic investors but from international ones.
At the same time, the early financial organisation emerged in different 
political contexts. As Bruce Mann has compellingly demonstrated, early cor-
porate bankruptcy law and organisation emerged in America as the young 
republic emerged. First, American debtors were in many cases building the 
new republic with credit raised overseas, or at the very least from out of their 
state, so that the founding fathers saw local interests vulnerable to the de-
mands of English creditors, and state legislators saw local interests vulnera-
ble to the demands of out-of-state creditors.14 Secondly, American farmers 
emerged as a distinct interest group, of concern to the founding farmers, un-
like the tenant farmers of the landed, parliamentary class in England. Finally, 
American debtors were mobile, migrating west as opportunity beckoned or 
the local economy failed, and labour was, in any event, in short supply.15
10. MARTIN MAYER, THE BANKERS 58 (1974).
11. RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE 
OF MODERN FINANCE 5 (1990).
12. Id. at 11.
13. Id. at 31.
14. BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN 
INDEPENDENCE 136 (2002).
15. Id. at 128–29.
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Perhaps for all of these reasons, early American bankruptcy law subordi-
nated the interests of creditors to the court and to court-appointed assign-
ees.16 In England, in contrast, the political economy of the industrial 
revolution saw an uneasy alliance between the manufacturing class and the 
landed class,17 with a dominant ideology of laissez-faire. Although Eng-
land’s first experiment with a bankruptcy system in the hands of private ac-
tors was to be curtailed in 1883,18 it set a tone of private action on behalf of 
creditors when a debtor became insolvent which has distinguished English 
corporate bankruptcy ever since. The initial experience of “privatised” cor-
porate bankruptcy, together with the fact that the English system for raising 
credit for railroads had not involved an intermediary who saw an ongoing 
role on behalf of investors, both created an environment in which the newly 
emerging accountancy profession could find significant and remunerative 
work in the corporate bankruptcy field.
Thus, when the unstructured and competitive process of building rail-
roads resulted in busts in both America and England, each jurisdiction ap-
proached the problem in a distinct way, which, in both cases, was to lay 
enduring foundations for large corporate debt restructuring a century later. 
In America, the courts, the investment bankers and the managers of the rail-
roads cooperated together in reorganisation through the equity receiver-
ship.19 In an equity receivership of a distressed railroad, the creditors 
petitioned the court to place the railroad into receivership and the court 
would appoint the railroad managers to act as receivers. The objective of the 
receivership was to persuade the railroad’s bondholders to take receivership 
certificates in exchange for their debt claims. Lawyers at the emerging bank-
ruptcy bar played a crucial part, both being named as the receivers and re-
ceiving handsome fees under the auspices of the bankruptcy court.20 J.P.
Morgan, and other investment bankers in his mould, would gain control of 
the railroad reorganisation committee in order to monitor the case for the 
purposes of his investors (charging handsome fees in the process). But cru-
cially for current purposes, the court upheld the idea of “upset value” in order 
to persuade junior bondholders to provide new money. In other words, even 
16. ROWENA OLEGARIO, THE ENGINE OF ENTERPRISE: CREDIT IN AMERICA 73 (2016).
17. E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 195 (Penguin Books 1991) 
(1963).
18. V. MARKHAM LESTER, VICTORIAN INSOLVENCY: BANKRUPTCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT,
AND COMPANY WINDING-UP IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 170 (1995).
19. OLEGARIO, supra note 16, at 112.
20. WILLIAM D. COHAN, MONEY AND POWER: HOW GOLDMAN SACHS CAME TO RULE THE 
WORLD 41 (2011).
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at the end of the nineteenth century, the threat of valuation fights as motiva-
tion for bargaining is clearly visible.
In England, on the other hand, early railroad restructurings proceeded 
voluntarily, using arbitration as the principal method of reaching agree-
ment.21 In 1862, the Companies Act “empowered a liquidator, with” court 
sanction, “to enter into compromises with creditors.”22 Various reforms to 
the procedure followed, but it was only in 1907, following the report of the 
Loreburn Law Amendment Committee,23 that the requirement that the com-
pany be placed into liquidation was dispensed with. However, this appears 
to have been more as a matter of procedure and convenience than of sub-
stance, and it is perhaps unsurprising that schemes were subsequently to be 
assessed against the counterfactual of a liquidation. Indeed, that is how they 
got their start: just as an individual bankrupt could avoid bankruptcy by 
reaching a compromise with his creditors, so a company could avoid liqui-
dation by agreeing a compromise with its creditors. Furthermore, whereas 
J.P. Morgan and the great investment bankers of his day dominated large 
corporate restructuring in America, the newly created accountancy profes-
sion was very much involved in large corporate restructuring in England. 
Thus, the firms of Harding, Pullein, Whinney & Gibbons and Turquand, 
Youngs, predecessors of the modern-day Ernst & Young, earned particularly 
lucrative fees from the failures of Overend & Gurney and the European 
Bank. However, the work of the accountant in England in these large corpo-
rate restructurings largely involved realising assets for the benefit of credi-
tors or, later and in the case of so-called industrials such as breweries, in the 
reconstruction of operations.24 In contrast, J.P. Morgan lowered the rail-
road’s fixed costs by exchanging bonds into shares, issuing the new equity 
based on the predicted earnings of the reconstructed railroad.25 Morgan
would subsequently establish a voting trust to run the railroad; as Chernow 
puts it, “Remote from the scene, the capital providers, the London investors, 
had ceded much of their power to the banker, Pierpont Morgan.”26
21. Michael Lobban, ‘Cutting the Gordian Knot?’ Arbitration and Company Insolvency in the 
1870s, in LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS: SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE IN ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 
283, 283 (Matthew Dyson & David Ibbetson eds., 2013).
22. JENNIFER PAYNE, SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 7
(2014).
23. See generally COMPANY LAW AMENDMENT COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE COMPANY LAW 
AMENDMENT COMMITTEE, 1906, [Cd. 3052] (U.K.).
24. EDGAR JONES, ACCOUNTANCY AND THE BRITISH ECONOMY 1840–1980: THE EVOLUTION OF 
ERNST & WHINNEY 98 (1981).
25. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS 183–84 (1993).
26. RON CHERNOW, THE DEATH OF THE BANKER: THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE GREAT 
FINANCIAL DYNASTIES AND THE TRIUMPH OF THE SMALL INVESTOR 24 (1997).
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American manufacturers relied heavily on retained earnings for devel-
opment at the start of the twentieth century.27 In his path finding work, Alfred 
Chandler analysed the revolutionary changes to American industry at the end 
of the nineteenth century. He charted the process of growth by forward and 
backward expansion which produced giants of American industry, adopting 
mass production and mass distribution techniques which generated impres-
sive cash flows to finance expansion at a time when the new required ma-
chinery was inexpensive.28 The firms relied on cash flow supported by short-
term loans from local commercial banks to provide working and fixed capi-
tal.29 However, where firms adopted a merger path towards expansion, it was 
necessary to go to the capital markets for funds: American Cotton Oil, Amer-
ican Sugar, National Lead, and National Cordage all issued common stock 
but also preferred stock secured by fixed assets.30 Moreover, some of the 
early industrial behemoths demanded costly machinery and intensive use of 
energy with higher capital costs. The highly centralised and institutionalized 
capital markets, which had developed in America in the 1850s to raise capital 
from overseas investors for the construction of the railroads, were now avail-
able for the rapidly expanding industries which required them, and bankers, 
brokers and investors were all looking for new securities to buy and sell.31
Morgan was standing by to perform his habitual coordination role, able to 
access significant pools of capital to finance the mergers.32 By the 1890s, 
America was enjoying buoyant conditions in its capital markets, but financial 
failures were to follow. Whilst some firms went into receivership and were 
subsequently liquidated, investment bankers such as Morgan continued their 
role as a financial intermediary who would step in to coordinate a complex 
debt restructuring as circumstances required (or members of the bankruptcy 
bar would fulfil a similar function).
Thus, in 1907, Milliken Brothers, one of the country’s largest steel con-
tractors, was forced into receivership. August Heckscher, one of the receiv-
ers, together with Waddill Catchings, a lawyer with Sullivan & Cromwell, 
successfully proposed a restructuring of the company’s debts (which in-
cluded a $3 million bond), allowing it to emerge from bankruptcy.33 In other 
27. CHANDLER, supra note 25, at 298, 373.
28. Id. at 238.
29. Id. at 311.
30. Id. at 330.
31. Id. at 332.
32. CHERNOW, supra note 26.
33. COHAN, supra note 20, at 41.
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words, although large industrial failure was relatively rare, where it did oc-
cur, complex debt restructuring continued to be visible throughout the early 
part of twentieth-century America.
Retained earnings were also the principal source of finance for manu-
facturers in England.34 Whilst America’s capital markets were enjoying 
buoyant conditions by the 1890s, only a handful of English commercial and 
industrial companies issued shares and debentures on the London Stock Ex-
change, notwithstanding its position as the leading stock exchange of the 
world.35 Like many American firms, British industrials turned to local banks 
to provide required capital.36 It appears that some local banks may have come 
to rely too heavily on certain local customers and to over-lend to these firms, 
resulting in a series of mid- and late-nineteenth-century bank failures of 
which the most significant (and devastating) was the failure of the City of 
Glasgow Bank in 1878.37 Britain then experienced an unprecedented wave 
of bank amalgamations, as publicly organised banks set out to acquire pri-
vately owned banking firms.38 A few large banks emerged who prized sta-
bility. As Cheffins puts it, “liquidity crises prompting bank failures in 1847, 
1857, 1866 and 1878 heightened awareness among bankers of how vulnera-
ble their businesses were to a loss of public confidence.”39 As a result, these 
banks had a bias in favour of liquid investments, lending short term loans 
(which they frequently rolled over) secured over the assets of the borrower. 
When British manufacturing and industrial companies did access the capital 
markets, it was more often to issue equities than debt securities.40 Another 
important innovation at the end of the nineteenth century was the develop-
ment of the floating charge in the English courts of Chancery. Although dis-
senters in the Loreburn Committee in 1906 recommended its abolition,41 the
floating charge emerged unscathed as a vital institutional force in the devel-
opment of English corporate distress. Thus, when large corporates faced dis-
tress in England in the twentieth century, they typically found themselves 
negotiating with the major bank that had financed their operations pursuant 
to a debenture granting fixed and floating security over all of their assets and 
carrying the right to appoint a receiver to realise the business and assets as a 
34. WILLIAM P. KENNEDY, INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE, CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE ORIGINS OF 
BRITISH ECONOMIC DECLINE 124 (1987); BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL:
BRITISH BUSINESS TRANSFORMED 72, 78 (2008).
35. CHEFFINS, supra note 34, at 56.
36. KENNEDY, supra note 34, at 121.
37. Id.
38. CHEFFINS, supra note 34, at 70.
39. Id. at 90–91.
40. Id. at 205.
41. See generally COMPANY LAW AMENDMENT COMMITTEE, supra note 23.
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going concern, or to break-up the business and sell the assets if a restructur-
ing could not be agreed. Just as they had raised finance through private ne-
gotiation, so efforts to agree revised terms took place through private 
negotiation.
Although legal requirements for audit and publication of financial in-
formation grew slowly in twentieth-century Britain, banks wishing to con-
vert to limited liability had had an obligation to publish balance sheets since 
1879.42 Banks, with their acute consciousness of the need for public confi-
dence and the knowledge that a loss would limit their ability to make further 
loans, were constitutionally opposed to taking provisions and writing down 
debt. At the same time, manufacturers and industrials in Britain simply did 
not expand to the monolithic size of their American counterparts in the same 
numbers. As a result, the sorts of large corporate debt restructuring master-
minded by the Morgans and other investment bankers in America were not 
a feature of the English market: bank and borrower would attempt to agree a 
rescheduling, sale of non-core businesses or assets, increases in interest rate,
and the like, and, if that failed, a receiver would be appointed and, usually, 
the business sold. In the absence of financial intermediaries active through-
out the life cycle of the firm, accountants played a crucial role not only as 
receivers but also assisting in negotiation efforts. After the collapses of in-
surance companies and railways in the nineteenth century, large corporate 
debt restructuring of the sort which continued to be practised in America 
virtually disappeared from the scene in England for almost a century. Amer-
ica, on the other hand, embraced the idea of restructuring a distressed com-
pany in order to return it to financial health.
The next significant milestone in organisational and institutional devel-
opment in America has already been well-charted: the consequences of the 
New Deal reforms of the Roosevelt government in the 1930s.43 In the febrile 
atmosphere of the time, all aspects of American investment banking and its 
power in the economy were in the line of fire. Most famously, Glass Steagall 
introduced sweeping reforms to split the business of investment and com-
mercial banking,44 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 included 
new and wide-ranging disclosure obligations designed, amongst other 
things, to reduce the monopoly of information enjoyed by the investment 
banking community and the power which that information afforded them. 
42. CHEFFINS, supra note 34, at 233.
43. DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 73–
100 (2001).
44. CHRIS O’MALLEY, BONDS WITHOUT BORDERS: A HISTORY OF THE EUROBOND MARKET 11–
12 (2015).
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Corporate bankruptcy and debt restructuring did not escape the reformers’ 
zeal. Of particular significance, reforms prevented the compromise of debt 
claims outside court. Outside the immediate field of corporate bankruptcy, 
other reforms were to have significant implications for the organisational and 
institutional structure of the American finance market. The first of these was 
the introduction of Regulation Q, which limited the interest banks could 
charge on demand deposits. This was intended to reduce competition 
amongst banks for deposits and increase stability but also enabled competi-
tors outside the regulation to compete for funds, with particular conse-
quences in the 1970s.45
Our account is then abruptly punctuated first by war and then by the 
extraordinary boom years of the 1950s and the 1960s. Large corporate debt 
restructuring unsurprisingly attracts very little attention in the historical rec-
ord in any of these three decades. However, significant shifts were continu-
ing to occur in the finance industry which were to have implications. In 
Cohan’s history of Goldman Sachs, Gustave Lehmann Levy, who was in
charge of Goldman’s arbitrage business, is recorded as becoming “active in 
arbitraging of railroad reorganisation securities” with the advent of World 
War II and diminishing opportunities for more traditional forms of arbi-
trage.46 Levy appears to have been encouraged by his friend (and competitor) 
Cy Lewis at Bear Sterns, who began contemplating buying railroad bonds, 
which were trading at a significant discount after the United States entered 
World War II, on the assumption that the United States would eventually win 
the war and there would be an urgent need to rebuild the railroad system.47
Levy was active in assisting the Murchison brothers, who had bought up 
bonds of the Missouri Pacific railroad, which filed for bankruptcy in 1933. 
The reorganisation plan was, in the usual way, for the railroad’s bonds to be 
exchanged into new securities of the reorganised company, but bond prices 
fluctuated significantly because of the sheer length of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding—twenty-three years!48 The contours of modern distressed debt trad-
ing are clearly visible in these accounts of arbitrage business in the 1930s 
and 1940s.
In the “healthy” finance market, Regulation Q was placing banks under 
strain in the battle to attract deposits and prompted First National City Bank
45. OLEGARIO, supra note 16, at 125; MAYER, supra note 10, at 50; O’MALLEY, supra note 44, at 
13.
46. COHAN, supra note 20, at 112.
47. Id. at 113.
48. Id. at 114–15.
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to launch the negotiable certificate of deposit, or CD.49 The crucial aspect of 
the CD was that it could be sold in the secondary market, and a rostrum of 
hungry financial institutions with an eye on trading became active in buying 
and selling CDs: Discount Corporation of America, Salomon Brothers and 
First Boston Corporation. Mayer explains how the CD solved the problem 
of Regulation Q:
What the CD had going for it on the open market was the chance to get 
around the Fed’s ceiling on interest rates on short-term deposits. Issued at 
3 percent per annum, a six-month CD could be bought in a secondary mar-
ket four months after it was issued; it would then, in effect, be a sixty-day 
time deposit paying three times the maximum interest rate the Fed allowed 
banks to offer.50
American corporations began to issue commercial paper, borrowing 
from the emerging institutional investor class—insurance companies, pen-
sion funds, university endowments, and the like—largely as a substitute for 
bank loans, which were suffering as a result of the consequences of Regula-
tion Q. Provided that the paper had a maturity of less than 270 days, it did 
not require registration under Securities and Exchange Commission regula-
tions. As “disintermediation” began to occur in the finance market, banks 
turned from focusing on asset management (attracting deposits) to liability 
management (borrowing in the increasingly deep and liquid markets),51 sup-
ported by the growth of a market for banks to lend money to each other.52
This interbank market developed in part as dollar deposits built up outside 
the United States as a result of the cap on interest rates at home and efforts 
by the U.S. government to prevent the outflow of dollars in the form of the 
Interest Equalisation Tax, which encouraged anyone who had a dollar de-
posit outside the United States to keep it there.53 This played a crucial role 
in the ongoing expansion of London as a financial centre and, more broadly, 
globalisation of the finance market.
The end of fixed commissions in 1975 heralded a new era of out-and-
out competition.54 Banks competed vigorously to appear in positions indi-
cating seniority of role in advertisements and issue documents, in order to 
49. MAYER, supra note 10, at 192; O’MALLEY, supra note 44, at 59.
50. MAYER, supra note 10, at 193.
51. Id. at 376.
52. O’MALLEY, supra note 44, at 14.
53. L.J. DAVIS, BAD MONEY 84 (1982); MAYER, supra note 10, at 456, 478–80; O’MALLEY, supra
note 44, at 26.
54. CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS’ BALL: THE INSIDE STORY OF DREXEL BURNHAM AND THE 
RISE OF THE JUNK BOND RAIDERS 63 (Penguin Books 1989) (1988).
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gain coveted league table places. In previous decades, underwriters of secu-
rities issues had been listed on tombstones in a preordained hierarchy gov-
erned by strict procedural rules.55 Mandates were no longer won on the back 
of carefully cultivated relationships, but on price.56 Crucially, for us, over 
the next two decades, risk was to develop, as Cohen elegantly puts it, “as a 
competitive measure.”57 As it became more difficult to make money in tra-
ditional banking, attention turned to trading.58 The rise of the institutional 
investor also contributed to the rise of the trading house, as the number of 
workers with company pensions exploded,59 and mutual funds and invest-
ment funds sought to buy and sell large blocks of securities.60 Trading houses 
put their capital to work, buying large blocks of securities from clients on the 
assumption that they would be able to sell the securities on at a higher price. 
These emerging trading houses had breath-taking capital requirements to 
carry the federal, municipal, and corporate debt securities in which they 
made markets, bringing further focus on sources of liquidity and driving fur-
ther innovation in the finance market. Repurchase agreements, or repos, de-
veloped as a vital source of liquidity for the traders. It is during this era of 
rapid innovation in American finance that many of the cooperative practices 
of the past were replaced by the competitive practices of the future.
Attitudes to debt were also changing. Academic work played a vital 
role, notably Modigliani and Millar’s theory of capital structure and price 
and (perhaps more significantly) W. Braddock Hickman’s study of the low-
grade bond market, in which he argued that a large, well-diversified portfolio 
of low-grade bonds outperformed a higher-grade portfolio over the long 
term.61 Innovators built on this academic work. Towards the end of the 
1970s, Michael Milken, an investment banker at Drexel Burnham Lambert, 
developed subordinated debt as another option for low-rated companies be-
sides borrowing short term money from banks on a senior secured basis with 
restrictive covenants and diluting existing equity through further equity is-
sues. This was to be the first vital step towards highly complex capital struc-
tures.62 And, as William Cohan points out, Lew Ranieri’s innovation at 
Salomon Brothers in 1977 was ultimately to shift American finance from 
55. Id. at 30.
56. O’MALLEY, supra note 44, at 75.
57. COHAN, supra note 20, at 361.
58. BRUCK, supra note 54, at 65.
59. SEBASTIAN MALLABY, MORE MONEY THAN GOD: HEDGE FUNDS AND THE MAKING OF A NEW 
ELITE 52 (2010).
60. COHAN, supra note 20, at 146; MALLABY, supra note 59, at 53.
61. BRUCK, supra note 54, at 28.
62. Id. at 45.
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knowing the buyer or seller of an investment, to merely focusing on the trans-
action.63 Ranieri’s idea was that Salomon could buy up mortgage loans from 
local banks and package them together, selling the resulting securities: what 
we know today as securitisation. The development of securitisation was ab-
solutely fundamental to a profound shift in the finance market. Before secu-
ritisation, a bank lending money to a home owner would hold that loan to 
maturity. After securitisation, what mattered for the bank was the ability to 
sell the loan to a securitisation vehicle, which could then fund it by the issue 
of bonds. Securitisation was followed by other innovations, such as collater-
alised debt obligations and collateralised loan obligations (CDOs and CLOs) 
and ultimately synthetic CDOs. This became known as the “originate and 
distribute” model and is a vital cog in the shift in the institutional order,
which has had significant implications for debt restructuring in both America 
and England.
Government tax reform also did much to incentivise debt over equity 
capital raising by making interest payments on debt tax-deductible,64 and in 
the new world of transactional finance, attitudes to liquidity shifted so that 
developing new ways in which money could be borrowed was heavily in-
centivised. And finally, hedging techniques were developed to limit risk,65
facilitated by publication of Fisher Black and Myron Scholes’s options pric-
ing model in 1973 and leading eventually to the development of the Interna-
tional Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) in 1985 to standardise 
documentation. Whereas mangers in America and England had been highly 
cautious of debt right up until the end of the 1960s, they now began to em-
brace it. In 1968, President Johnson announced strict controls on the ability 
of U.S. corporates to invest overseas, designed to address the growing prob-
lem in U.S. Balance of Payments.66 This provided an immediate fillip to the 
newly emerging Eurobond markets, as U.S. corporates were forced to bor-
row overseas. The market rapidly became overwhelmed by the vast paper-
work involved in the issues, and this led eventually to the formation of 
Morgan’s pioneering clearing house, Bondclear, in New York. A new Euro-
pean clearing house, followed: Euroclear, modelled on Bondclear and ini-
tially owned by Morgan Guaranty,67 and a separate venture by the 
Luxembourg banks known as Centrale de Livraison de Valeurs Mobilières, 
or Cedel. Although the immediate consequences of all of these changes in 
63. COHAN, supra note 20, at 471.
64. BRUCK, supra note 54, at 99.
65. O’MALLEY, supra note 44, at 64.
66. Id. at 35–36.
67. Id. at 38–39; COHAN, supra note 20, at 158; BRUCK, supra note 54, at 25.
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market infrastructure for the institutional order of corporate bankruptcy were 
perhaps not entirely apparent until later, when they did become visible, it
was clear how significant they were.
Penn Central was at the forefront of the new attitude to debt. Formed 
by the merger of the Pennsylvania and New York Central Railroads, it rep-
resented the largest merger in American corporate history at the time and 
survived for 872 days.68 The company was financing itself almost entirely in 
the commercial paper markets, such that it needed to continuously roll over 
its borrowings in order to stay solvent. Yet losses continued to mount: it lost 
$101.6 million in the first quarter of 1970.69 When it could finally no longer 
roll over its short-term borrowings, it became the largest single bankruptcy 
in American corporate history at the time. Goldman Sachs was caught up in 
the maelstrom as Penn Central’s broker and dealer in its commercial paper,
with many investors (and subsequently the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission) concluding that it had gone on selling the paper long after it should 
have been aware of the company’s financial difficulties, whilst ensuring that 
the firm had no exposure to Penn Central at the time of its bankruptcy.70 The 
incident was to highlight the risks of operating in the new financial environ-
ment, but also the new world in which financial intermediaries operated in 
the American debt securities markets. But it also highlighted a new approach 
to litigation risk, which will be relevant later in our account: as Cohan puts 
it, “Goldman allowed an extraordinary amount of dirty laundry to be aired 
in public, in front of a jury, over a $2.4 million dispute.”71 Importantly, 
though, Penn Central was subject to a special reorganisation regime for rail-
roads and it was able to survive bankruptcy, reorganise, and emerge from 
bankruptcy protection. As a result, those who traded in the securities of the 
distressed firm were to make a handsome profit on the reorganisation, with 
important implications for the development of distressed trading.72
The second milestone did not end so happily. In 1975, W.T. Grant be-
came the largest mercantile bankruptcy in American history.73 The Grant 
failure was also a classic tale of mismanagement: a confused business model 
creating confusion in the mind of the American public, rapid expansion, bad 
store location, the wrong stock, and exposure to consumer credit. Like Penn 
Central, Grant financed itself in the commercial paper markets of the 1970s, 
68. DAVIS, supra note 53, at 19–20.
69. Id. at 43.
70. COHAN, supra note 20, at 168–85.
71. Id. at 180–81.
72. BRUCK, supra note 54, at 112; MALLABY, supra note 59, at 54.
73. DAVIS, supra note 53, at 53.
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and by 1974, it had short-term debt of $493.2 million and disastrous inven-
tory control.74 One hundred and forty-three banks had exposure to Grant as 
it teetered towards the edge and (possibly with the Fed’s insistence) these 
banks provided a lifeboat loan of $600 million to keep the business afloat.75
In the end, though, the company filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection 
in October 1975. At the time, the consent of the committee of creditors was 
required to reorganise in chapter 11 under the protection of the court: the 
banks refused, and W.T. Grant was shut down.
Further large failures followed. The government rescued the Lockheed 
Corporation (following a major bribery scandal) with a $200 million guar-
antee of the manufacturer’s debt;76 and Stirling Homex, Yale Express, and 
Equity Funding failed or almost failed. Corporate bankruptcy reform was 
already underway, motivated largely by a dramatic rise in consumer debt in 
the 1960s and persistent complaints about the costs of bankruptcy admin-
istration.77 But large corporate bankruptcy was on the agenda too, and sig-
nificant reforms were introduced. First, it was no longer necessary to have a 
bankruptcy trustee in every case, incentivising management to resort to the 
procedure as early as possible. Secondly, detailed provisions were included 
to enable the business of the corporate to be restructured within the protec-
tion of the process (for example, the detailed provisions of section 385 which 
deal with the rejection and assumption of executory contracts). Finally, a 
cram down mechanism was included in the form with which we are now 
familiar. As Elizabeth Warren points out in her elegant introductory text 
Chapter 11: Reorganizing American Business, the issues which face a dis-
tressed business and the problems which are to be addressed may vary, par-
ticularly between restructuring of the debt burden in the manner of the 
Morgan financial restructurings of the pre-New Deal era, or operational re-
structuring, where the causes of failure are not merely the debt burden but 
also mismanagement.78 Furthermore, the 1978 Bankruptcy Code reforms in 
the United States were implemented against a backdrop of industrial and 
manufacturing failure, leading to losses for customers and suppliers. It is 
perhaps not surprising, therefore, that in determining the allocation of equity 
in a debt restructuring or the impairment of suppliers or customers in a reor-
ganisation plan, chapter 11 focused on the post-restructuring value of the 
business. This is a theme which we will return to in Part III.
74. Id. at 61.
75. Id. at 63.
76. Id. at 130.
77. OLEGARIO, supra note 16, at 206.
78. See ELIZABETH WARREN, CHAPTER 11: REORGANIZING AMERICAN BUSINESS 4–6 (2008).
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At the same time that the United States experienced both a growth in 
debt and in large corporate failure, similar currents of change were stirring 
in England. Just as in America, English industrials and manufacturing com-
panies were seeking longer term funds in larger amounts. In 1968, Minos 
Zombanakis, a banker with Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company of New 
York stationed in Rome and representing the bank in the Middle East, per-
suaded his New York bosses to provide him with £5 million to start Manu-
facturers Hanover Limited in London and to develop the idea of the 
syndicated term loan.79 His idea was that the interest rate paid by the bor-
rower would be re-fixed every three to six months depending on the partici-
pating banks’ cost of funds at that time, together with a margin. A group of 
“reference banks” within the syndicate would report their cost of funds to the 
agent bank shortly before the interest rate fixing date, which was to develop 
into the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate, or LIBOR. The syndicated revolv-
ing and term loan was to provide the bread-and-butter financing for English 
corporates for the next twenty or so years. Economically, the 1970s were 
also the period in which England became reacquainted with large corporate 
failure. One event was to be particularly significant for debt restructuring: 
the secondary banking crisis. The secondary banking crisis occurred in Brit-
ain in the early 1970s, when unregulated lenders (what would today be 
known as shadow banks) lent fairly indiscriminately to the commercial prop-
erty sector. In the bust that followed, it became clear that the regulated banks, 
who had eschewed commercial property lending themselves, had nonethe-
less lent to the secondary banks. These banks were forced to provide a life-
boat for companies within the sector by the Governor of the Bank of 
England, in order to prevent rapid divestment of the property portfolios and 
a further deterioration in the market.80 Sir Kenneth Cork, probably the lead-
ing insolvency accountant of his day, sought to implement various schemes 
of reconstruction for one of the major players, the Stern Group, using the 
Companies Act schemes of arrangement procedure. But he found that legal 
fees were rapidly mounting, whilst creditors were still resisting signing up. 
Instead, his firm, Cork Gully, promoted an informal scheme backed by the 
pressure of the regulator, the Bank of England.81 This was to prove enor-
mously influential in the next decade.
In 1979, Sir Kenneth Cork reported on the reform of English corporate 
bankruptcy law. The main innovation suggested by the committee was the 
79. O’MALLEY, supra note 44, at 47.
80. See KENNETH CORK WITH HUGH BARTY-KING, CORK ON CORK: SIR KENNETH CORK TAKES 
STOCK 93–94 (1988).
81. Id. at 195.
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introduction of a new procedure of “administration.” Amongst other things, 
administration was intended to incentivise the directors to act earlier to seek 
corporate bankruptcy protection, and Cork explicitly envisaged the possibil-
ity that a company may be restructured and may trade out of its difficulties.82
Perhaps not surprisingly, however, given that Sir Kenneth Cork was an in-
solvency accountant, the new procedure held firm to the idea that an insol-
vency office holder, to be known as the administrator, should be appointed 
in much the same way that receivers had been appointed for the last half-
century in England and Wales. The procedure offered none of the mechanics 
of a chapter 11 to impose a restructuring and suffered from other significant 
flaws. In the end, the decision to embed it within the existing institutional 
order of the day, rather than reimagining the corporate debt restructuring 
framework in light of the significant institutional change which had occurred 
in the finance market, may have been fatal to its chances of success (and the 
company voluntary arrangement procedure, implemented specifically as a 
debt restructuring procedure, could not affect secured debt which was to se-
verely limit its role in the complex debt restructurings that were to move into 
view in future decades). Corporate debt restructuring largely continued to be 
an out-of-court affair. Initially, the English banks were incentivised to bar-
gain out-of-court in part through the soft power of the Bank of England,
which laid down principles of restructuring inspired by the Bank’s experi-
ence of the secondary banking crisis (and which became known as the Lon-
don Approach).83 When the Bank stepped away from this role (in part as a 
result of regulatory changes and in part as a result of a change in policy), the 
principles continued to hold good in the relatively “clubby” world of the day 
in which a bank could not afford to upset a peer who wielded the power to 
exclude it from future syndicates.84
In the 1980s, President Reagan, in America, and Margaret Thatcher, in 
England, launched full-scale deregulation initiatives. In 1979, exchange con-
trols were lifted in the United Kingdom and preparations began for “Big 
Bang”: the wholesale deregulation of the London Stock Exchange. Banks 
and investment houses began to buy up the old U.K. brokers, and U.S. in-
vestment banks arrived in London with gusto. As O’Malley puts it, “the 
clubby atmosphere of the Square Mile” was replaced by “the rapacious, bo-
nus-grabbing culture of the investment bank,”85 or as Cohan reports the head 
82. Id. at 194–95.
83. Sarah Paterson, Bargaining in Financial Restructuring: Market Norms, Legal Rights and Reg-
ulatory Standards, 14 J. CORP. L. STUD. 333, 335–36 (2014).
84. Id. at 336.
85. O’MALLEY, supra note 44, at 93.
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of Goldman Sachs, Goldman’s U.S. style caught on because its bankers were 
“‘younger, seemed brighter, were better informed, had new ideas’ [and] 
‘sometimes were a little brash but didn’t waste time talking about their golf 
game.’”86 The market was finally diversified and truly global. U.S. compet-
itive practices began to overtake the somewhat more genteel environment in 
the London market. When Armin Mattle was appointed Managing Director 
of UBS (Securities), he insisted that underwriters of security issues must 
honour their commitments if they had failed to place the securities in the 
market, eschewing the traditional practice of allowing Eurobond underwrit-
ers to return unplaced paper to the lead manager, according to O’Malley, 
stating that “syndication was a business not a charity.”87
In America, deregulation was to have a number of unforeseen conse-
quences for debt restructuring. First, a significant number of savings and 
loans associations in the United States went bankrupt, and the ensuing gov-
ernment bailout meant that, for a time, the U.S. government was the biggest 
holder of distressed debt. As a result, the Garn–St. Germain Depositary In-
stitutions Act of 1982 authorised federally chartered savings and loans asso-
ciations to make commercial debts and invest in corporate debt securities. At 
the same time that this deregulatory movement was underway, Michael 
Milken pioneered junk bond financing of takeovers and he found a ready 
pool of investment capital in the newly liberated savings and loans associa-
tions.88 Milken’s innovation, together with the removal of antitrust regula-
tions as part of Reagan’s deregulatory agenda, was to fuel the merger-mania 
in the 1980s American mergers and acquisitions market, with profound con-
sequences for debt restructuring in the 1990s.89 A hungry suitor could bor-
row in the junk bond market and launch a bid for an unsuspecting target, 
sometimes subsequently stripping assets after purchase in order to fund re-
payment of the acquisition debt, or simply using the cash from the acquisi-
tion target to service the debt. The leveraged buyout, or LBO, had been born. 
Notwithstanding Milken’s fall from grace, charged with insider dealing and 
securities fraud, and the collapse of the investment bank he worked for, 
Drexel Burnham Lambert, the LBO was in time to be exported to England. 
In more immediate terms for corporate bankruptcy, many of the deals of this 
era (the deal to take Macy’s private, for example) were to be the bankruptcies 
of the next decade.90
86. COHAN, supra note 20, at 211.
87. O’MALLEY, supra note 44, at 61–62.
88. BRUCK, supra note 54, at 91.
89. Id. at 97.
90. COHAN, supra note 20, at 240.
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Although Cy Lewis and Levin had famously bought distressed bonds in 
the 1940s, and Michael Milken got his start buying distressed bonds in the 
1970s,91 towards the end of the 1980s, the business of trading in distressed 
securities began to be institutionalised: Goldman Sachs started a proprietary 
$783.5 million distressed fund named Water Street Corporation Recovery 
Fund, investing in distressed debt securities specifically with the ambition of 
taking control of the business through the anticipated swap of debt for equity 
in the reorganization plan—the loan-to-own strategy,92 or in the expectation 
that some other solution would be found, causing the price of the bonds to 
rise (such as Goldman’s investment in the troubled toy-truck maker, Tonka, 
in 1990 in anticipation of a bid from Mattel, Inc. in the event Hasbro was the 
successful bidder, but the strategy held good).93 As mentioned, Water Street 
was a proprietary fund, investing the money of Goldman Sachs’s partners. 
This led to serious questions about conflicts of interest in restructuring ne-
gotiations: in the Tonka case itself; in the case of Journal Company, a news-
paper company who Goldman had previously advised; and in the case of 
USG Corp, a gypsum-board manufacturer for whom Goldman had previ-
ously acted as underwriter.94 Water Street was eventually wound up, but the 
Special Situations Group, or SSG, took its place,95 and Goldman was to be 
under the microscope again in the efforts to save Long Term Capital Man-
agement in 1998.96 Multiple, conflicting interests are to be an important fea-
ture of our analysis, but so too is what Mallaby calls “[a]n ecosystem of 
smaller players” with a “rich range of investment styles.”97 The number of 
specialist funds focused on distressed debt was to prove crucial in the next 
stage of corporate debt restructuring’s development, as was the fact that none 
of these funds faced the regulatory capital constraints of the banking sector.
Once these organisational changes began to cross the Atlantic to Eng-
land, the glue which had kept the London Approach in place and supported 
out-of-court bargaining began to weaken and eventually evaporated almost 
completely.98 At the same time, another innovator, Blythe Masters, worked 
as part of the team at J.P. Morgan in London attempting to develop the idea 
of a credit default swap to protect against the risk of default on a loan or debt 
91. BRUCK, supra note 54, at 33–34.
92. COHAN, supra note 20, at 296.
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94. Id. at 298–99.
95. Id. at 378.
96. Id. at 401.
97. MALLABY, supra note 59, at 192.
98. Paterson, supra note 83, at 337–52.
820 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 93:3
security.99 At first, concern existed amongst investors as to precisely when 
they would be entitled to trigger payout under the CDS contracts. But in 1999 
when ISDA published its Credit Derivatives Definitions, listing the six so-
called credit events which could be incorporated into CDS contracts, the 
market took off.100 Once again, this was to have perhaps unforeseen conse-
quences for the negotiation of debt restructuring in the decades which fol-
lowed. Meanwhile, the ever-increasing competition to win mandates steadily 
eroded creditor protection in debt documentation,101 and the increasing reli-
ance of English corporates on bond markets resulted in increasingly opaque 
groups of debt holders, whose identities would not be revealed by the clear-
ing systems through which the bonds were held.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INSTITUTIONAL ORDER AND BARGAINING 
AND LITIGATION
We have, then, seen radical and far-reaching structural change in the 
finance markets in America and England, with consequences for corporate 
debt restructuring practice in both jurisdictions. This brings us to the first
part of the two-part thesis of this paper: the structural change has also re-
sulted in significant changes in the institutional order, and those changes in 
the institutional order have implications for the utility of the bargaining and 
litigation model in corporate debt restructuring. “Institution” is used here in 
the sense of the institutional economists: the values, customs, and norms at 
work in the market which interact with formal rules such as corporate debt 
restructuring law and in which those formal rules are embedded.102 In other 
words, in assessing our approach to valuation, we need to understand not just 
formal rules, but also how those formal rules will interact with informal 
rules, norms, and beliefs.
The first significant shift in the institutional environment was from a 
generally cooperative to a generally competitive ecosystem. When bargain-
ing and litigation was first developed in the context of the equity receivership 
and the pre-1930s restructurings of railroads and other politically sensitive
firms, J.P. Morgan and his descendants were part of a class of men conscious 
of what Chernow calls the “Gentleman Banker’s Code,”103 fiercely loyal to 
99. O’MALLEY, supra note 44, at 149.
100. Id. at 152.
101. Id. at 180.
102. See NORTH, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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their investors and genuinely outraged at the business practices of what Jo-
sephson was later to name the “robber barons.”104 The investors Morgan rep-
resented were entirely in his hands, often even having very little idea of 
where the railroad operated.105 As Chernow puts it, he acted as “an enforcer 
on the ground who could knock sense into railroad chieftains and inculcate 
a sense of responsibility.”106 His role as trusted arbiter was vital to his busi-
ness model, hosting negotiations on board his yacht, Corsair, and refusing to 
allow it back to shore until a deal had been struck. Morgan then took the 
technology which he had developed for railroads and applied it to the indus-
trial trusts. As we have seen, many of these companies saw the need to merge 
in order to expand and prosper in the American market, and Morgan stood 
ready to fulfil his intermediation role throughout the life cycle of the busi-
ness. Companies agreed virtually exclusive arrangements with their 
banker,107 and such competition as there was for business was conducted in 
a genteel, respectful manner. For much of this period, secure in their sphere 
of influence, Morgan and other American investment bankers were able to 
treat relations with the bankruptcy court as something of a partnership. The 
court would look threateningly at the case, with the potential for a low “upset 
value,” and Morgan would leverage the risk of an unfavourable court deci-
sion in private negotiation. In other words, in the cooperative market of the 
time, bargaining and litigation provided a powerful tool for a powerful inter-
mediary.
The decision to remove the financial intermediary from the decision-
making process was a significant element of the 1930s New Deal reforms in 
America, but, even then, it seems likely that investors for some time would 
have abided by a more cooperative ethic in bargaining. As we have seen in 
England, large corporate debt restructuring rather fell away from the picture 
to be replaced by private negotiation. Yet once again, that private negotiation 
would have been dominated by the respectful attitude to competition in the 
English banking market. Kynaston has shown how, after the amalgamation 
movement at the end of the nineteenth century, British banking operated as 
something of a cartel, with even more of a club-like atmosphere than the 
somewhat genteel American banking community.108 Banks were jealous of 
their relationships, which they maintained assiduously, respecting each 
104. MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS: THE GREAT AMERICAN CAPITALISTS 1861–
1901, at vii (Transaction Publishers 2011) (1934).
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other’s sphere of influence. In this context, negotiating against the backdrop 
of liquidation may have worked very well indeed.
The first, and most obvious, change in the institutional order, which our 
brief history in Part II reveals, is the utter decline in this cooperative and 
respectful milieu to one of almost unbridled competition amongst highly mo-
tivated and educated investors. It is difficult to believe that a modern hedge 
fund, or distressed trading desk, is likely to feel any obligation to respect the 
sphere of influence of a competitor, or to offer it something in a deal out of 
obligation, or fairness, or any other social ethic motive. In this environment, 
neither the threat of unpredictable litigation nor the threat of liquidation 
(which may seem scarcely credible) may achieve successful bargaining. Col-
laboration, or cooperation, demands some self-restraint, well-adapted to the 
process of compromise and bargaining. The requirement to give something 
away in the bargain, of some sort of emotional exchange in order to reach a 
settlement, is undermined by the pursuit of the extreme profit motive and, as 
Richard Sennett describes, the “ethos of giving back to people just, and only, 
what they ‘deserve.’”109 Sennett suggests that bargaining, in this context, is 
likely to be “aggressive opinion-pushing rather than real give-and-take dis-
cussion.”110
Indeed, the second change, which our account reveals, is an entirely 
new attitude to risk. When private individuals were investing wealth in the 
American or the English railways, it seems unlikely that they were motivated 
by risk-taking. Indeed, the evidence rather suggests that they had little idea 
that there was risk in the investment, and that the subsequent busts in railroad 
investment came as a significant shock. This contrasts with Cohan’s account 
of the rise of “risk as a competitive measure.”111 In other words, risk is to be 
embraced in modern financial markets because it is the culture of risk-taking 
which is likely to give rise to an “edge” to the making of money. This is 
visible in Bruck’s story of the rise (and fall) of Michael Milken and in Se-
bastian Mallaby’s account of the rise of hedge fund traders such as Steinhardt 
and Druckenmiller.112 The essence of the bargaining and litigation idea is 
that the uncertainty of the litigation outcome will result in bargaining. But 
this is poorly adapted to an environment dominated by a high appetite for 
risk-taking in which the possibility of successful litigation may result in far 
109. RICHARD SENNETT, RESPECT: THE FORMATION OF CHARACTER IN AN AGE OF INEQUALITY 220 
(2003).
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greater rewards than the conservative bargain which might be struck. As Sen-
nett puts it, “the good risk-taker has to dwell in ambiguity and uncer-
tainty.”113
Equally important to this is the shift from a culture of the firm to the 
culture of the individual. Although J.P. Morgan and the other great bankers 
of their day launched American investment banking in a climate of stars and 
personalities, the maturing investment firms which they founded rapidly 
prized teamwork, integrity, and placing client interests first. In this environ-
ment, there were strong motivations to uphold the brand of the firm and its 
strong, durable, institutional values in bargaining—integrity, solidity, relia-
bility. As Sennett describes it, “esteem in the iron cage [of corporate life] 
comes from service to the institution; approval is conferred by an institution 
upon an individual for belonging.”114 But this culture of teamwork, of com-
pany man, has rapidly been replaced by the cult of the individual, reinforced 
by compensation structures which treat each trader as an individual profit-
making centre.115 In this environment, there is no sense of anything greater 
than oneself, or of values sustained by the firm which must be maintained, 
or of being an agent for a client. The market eschews institutionalism in fa-
vour of flexibility and what Sennett calls “entrepreneurial virtues.”116 This 
means that each individual is only as good as their last deal, and that all re-
lationships, management, client, and employment, are seen as temporary. 
Compensation models reflect this: as Bruck puts it, “[i]t would hardly be like 
Drexel to place a higher value on respectability than on performance,” and 
“salaries were moderate and all the heavy compensation came in bo-
nuses.”117 This has two immediate consequences for the bargaining and liti-
gation model. First, the individual is likely to embrace risk in the negotiation, 
rather than to treat the risk of litigation as an incentive to bargain. Secondly, 
to the extent that the individual does behave aggressively in the negotiation, 
it is unlikely that it will bring consequences for future deals. In other words, 
the temporary nature of all of the players makes the market far less willing 
to practice exclusionary measures, so that a second way in which social 
norms such as bargaining can be enforced disappears. At the same time, com-
pensation is not just an end in itself, but a route to social status and prestige 
in what Sennett calls the “natural aristocracy” of the financial markets. Sen-
nett identifies belief in work “as the single most important source of both 
113. RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER: THE PERSONAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
WORK IN THE NEW CAPITALISM 85 (1998).
114. SENNETT, supra note 109, at 168–69.
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mutual respect and self-respect,”118 evidenced by compensation awarded.119
If risky litigation is the route to greater reward and strong work identity, so 
be it: market failure is the source of loss of self-esteem.120
The market enforcement point is of greater significance. Bargaining and 
litigation, as it was originally conceived, reinforced the market’s ability to 
discipline itself. At the time of Morgan, both Morgan’s desire to return to the 
capital markets for future investment and the investors’ desire to be invited 
into future offerings acted to reinforce “good” behaviour in bargaining, 
whilst the market norms of the day around respect for each other’s sphere of 
influence and a generally cooperative version of capitalism supported the 
bargaining outcome. Once the players in the market see their position as tem-
porary, this willingness to discipline past behaviour is considerably weak-
ened, so that the threat of exclusion from the market becomes less of a force 
in the bargaining, putting more strain on the threat of litigation: Sennett calls 
this the “increasingly short framework of shared time.”121 At the same time, 
the market will only discipline behaviour which it regards as out of line with 
the behaviour which it expects. As we have seen in Part II, many of the strat-
egies which were originally advanced by loners, outsiders, or contrarians 
have become an accepted market strategy: as Bruck puts it, “Milken’s gospel 
had gained such currency that it was no longer the heresy of an outcast but 
the liturgy of Wall Street.”122 Strategies which were initially regarded as vul-
gar and had nomenclatures to match—vulture funds, junk bonds—gradually 
became gentrified with gentrified names to match—distressed debt traders 
and high-yield bonds. Indeed, as Richard Sennett notes, when Philip Augar 
chronicled the breakdown of “gentlemanly capitalism” in the City of Lon-
don, he “[was] struck by how the traditional old-boy network has in fact 
given way to an equally clubby new-boy network.”123 It is a mistake not to 
see a distinct consciousness of the group in the new markets, a collective 
ideology, and to understand how it works. Innovative and aggressive strate-
gies are not only introduced to, but also embraced by, the market.124 Once 
this occurs, the market’s willingness to discipline aggressive strategies de-
clines, and the support which must be provided by market norms for the bar-
gaining and litigation approach falls away. Indeed, others are likely to imitate 
118. SENNETT, supra note 109, at 109.
119. SENNETT, supra note 113, at 71.
120. SENNETT, supra note 109, at 115.
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the behaviour they observe,125 and the aggressive, profit-maximising strate-
gies are the values which bind the group together. Bargaining and litigation 
is under threat because the core values and behaviour of the market have 
changed. In this context, “honour” in the group (meaning both codes of con-
duct within the group and what Sennett calls “a kind of erasure of social 
boundaries and distance”)126 is affirmed by pursuing economically rational 
but potentially destructive litigation. Bound up in all of this are complicated 
ideas that the gentlemanly markets of the past, far from being worthy of ad-
miration, were lazy, unmeritocratic, corrupt. New markets, with their com-
mitment to labour and proving oneself through a competitive work ethic,127
uphold modern, universal values. Many scholars and commentators have la-
belled the extremes of behaviour which appear: Piketty calls it “meritocratic 
extremism”;128 Cohan, “meritocracy gone haywire”;129 Sennett, the “dark 
side of the doctrine of careers open to talent”;130 and Robert Frank and Philip 
Cook, the “winner-take-all” society.131 None of it contributes to the effec-
tiveness of bargaining and litigation as a model.
Furthermore, increasing specialisation in strategy makes it significantly 
harder for the threat of market exclusion to operate. Indeed, this proved fatal 
to the functioning of the London Approach in England. A distressed fund 
trader is unlikely to be moved by threats of exclusion from the primary mar-
kets, even if he is persuaded by the credibility of the threat in a market driven 
primarily by price rather than relationship. Firms compete to find new niches 
and may move from one niche to another. In other words, the market is in a 
perpetual state of innovation.132
The shift which has occurred in these new ways of doing business from 
relationships to transactions also has a profound implication for the way in 
which bargaining occurs. In the days of Morgan, Pierpont was acutely aware 
of the business below the capital structure. Indeed, his business model de-
manded that he take an active interest in the business itself, taking seats on 
boards and exercising influence. This caused Louis Brandeis and others to 
fear the investment banker as the new monopoly and led to the New Deal 
125. SENNETT, supra note 109, at 89.
126. Id. at 55.
127. Id. at 58.
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reforms.133 The British banks, too, maintained close relationships with their 
borrowers and, although they were frequently accused through the historical 
record of not understanding their clients’ business, were clearly aware of the 
business which was being financed. The shifts to an “originate and distrib-
ute” model briefly traced in Part II have caused the business of finance to 
become increasingly remote from the businesses being financed. Indeed, 
Mallaby says of one hedge fund owner, “[h]e wanted people who would ap-
proach the markets as a mathematical puzzle, unconnected to the flesh and 
blood and bricks and mortar of a real economy.”134 This sense of remoteness 
engendered by the shift towards transactional finance is reinforced by the 
sheer complexity which has emerged in capital structure, hedging, and in-
vesting. What Cohan calls “intellectual and financial jousting”135 reinforces
the sense of a game to be won with superior mathematical ability and instinct. 
Bargaining and litigation loses its force as the negotiation over the future of 
a real, living-and-breathing business employing individuals is replaced with 
a mathematical game to be won by aggressively pursuing the boundaries of 
the rules. The loss of relationships is also important because the “game” has 
become depersonalised. Not only J.P. Morgan, but all of the investment 
bankers of his day and even the workout bankers in Britain in the middle of 
the twentieth century would have had some sense of personal honour and 
reputation; that there was an element which was personal in facing off 
against others round the negotiating table. In modern financial markets, the 
game is far less personal. Of course, there is much about this which is a good
thing: clout and class connections replaced with brainpower and determina-
tion and a much-reduced ability to use the club to keep members in and out-
siders out. But it also makes debt restructuring about pushing the rules, 
seeing what it is possible to get away with. There are still redlines, as the 
treatment of Bear Sterns in the crisis following its refusal to join the lifeboat 
for Long Term Capital Management, or the treatment of Drexel Burnham 
Lambert after Michael Milken’s fall from grace, demonstrate. But they are 
far fainter and there are far fewer of them. Bargaining and litigation does not 
work well in this highly depersonalised environment.
Nonetheless, we are used to thinking of reputation as an important 
bonding mechanism. When we use reputation in this sense, we tend to mean 
some vague sense of “behaving properly.” But “reputation” is not, as Sennett 
might put it, a “static quality.”136 Today’s financier may want another type 
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of reputation entirely—a reputation for being tough, for enforcing legal 
rights, for chasing every, last cent. Indeed, discussing one hedge fund trader, 
Mallaby comments that “his reputation was also significant. When people 
saw the wild cowboy coming, they assumed that he would make the market 
move.”137 Conventional ways of doing things are to be disrupted, and the 
trader may wish to cultivate a reputation for being creative, aggressive, and 
visionary. In this context, an uncertain litigation environment may provide 
grist to the mill. At the same time, the trader is likely to study the legal envi-
ronment to try to understand where the opportunities lie. Far from being 
afraid of litigation risk, he will study and assess it for any benefits which it 
may deliver.
Finally, our story in Part II identified an increasingly opaque market, in 
which a number of small players have a vast array of different investment 
strategies,138 where conflicts of interest may be hard to discern and may lead 
to unexpected results; where it may be difficult to establish the identity of 
the investors and where rapid trading will continue throughout the case. This 
has implications for the relationships necessary for successful bargaining.
IV. A WAY FORWARD?
The first part of the thesis of this paper, then, is that changes in the 
organisational structure of the finance market in America and England have 
led to the development of a different institutional order in the finance market. 
The second part is that this has, in turn, fundamentally altered the incentives 
to bargain in chapter 11 and has made litigation considerably more likely. 
As we have seen, the development of the scheme of arrangement against the 
counterfactual of an insolvency had very different roots in England. None-
theless, it was also well-adapted to the institutional environment of the time. 
Railroad capital in England was raised locally from the landed classes, gen-
tleman farmers, and the like. These investors would also have had a strong 
sense of the ethics of the day and were likely to see merit in behaving well 
in negotiation. They are also likely to have deferred to the experts who were 
brought into these situations to advise them, notably the accountants who 
were beginning to establish themselves as a professional class. Many of these 
accountants had established reputations as railroad accountants. In 1880, 
English accountancy gained its Royal Charter, and the various bodies repre-
senting accountants united to form the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
137. MALLABY, supra note 59, at 145.
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England and Wales. 139 It seems likely that, just as Morgan was the trusted 
arbiter of English investors in U.S. railroad reorganisations, the accountants 
who advised in railway reconstruction would have been regarded as expert 
advisers for the middle-class local investors who had put their wealth into 
railway investment. As we have seen, the scheme of arrangement then 
largely fades from the picture of corporate debt restructuring for almost a 
century, but when it reappears, it reasserts its commitment to the counterfac-
tual approach. In previous works, the author has argued that there are merits 
in this approach: in its greater level of objectivity and in the position of the 
corporate bankruptcy judge. But it must also be acknowledged that it is a 
somewhat blunt approach, which may not be well-adapted to some sorts of 
debt restructuring involving more vulnerable creditors, and which may not 
inspire market confidence.
Recent debate about reform of chapter 11 in the United States has ques-
tioned whether some sort of independent mediator could be appointed to help 
mediate between the parties and, potentially, to assist the bankruptcy judge 
in a complex debt restructuring case. The European Commission proposal 
suggests that member states may require the appointment of a practitioner in 
the field of restructuring where the restructuring plan needs to be confirmed 
by a judicial or administrative authority by means of a cross-class cram 
down.140 In England there is already a party well-positioned to take this role, 
in the shape of the insolvency practitioner. In most cases, the company will 
be arguing in favour of the restructuring on the basis that it produces a better 
result for creditors as a whole than the best available alternative option, 
which will often be an administration sale of the business and assets as a 
going concern. But for this analysis to withstand scrutiny, the administrator-
in-waiting must be convinced of the case for moving to a sale transaction if 
the debt restructuring fails. This is because paragraph 3(1)(a) of Schedule B1 
to the Insolvency Act 1986 mandates a rescue of the company as the first 
purpose of the administration unless the administrator thinks that is not rea-
sonably practicable and he acts in the best interests of creditors, in which 
case he can move down the hierarchy of purposes to a going concern sale.
There are considerable difficulties with the construction of the hierar-
chy in paragraph 3 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986, but it cannot 
be intended to entitle the senior class to hold the administrator to ransom and 
refuse the debt restructuring plan, where the administrator considers (weigh-
139. JONES, supra note 24, at 67, 69.
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ing the interests of the different classes and the expected recovery in an ad-
ministration) that another, fairer scheme is available and the question is the 
allocation of the debt and equity rather than strategic decisions such as who 
to sell the business to. There may thus be a role for an insolvency practi-
tioner. Indeed, one solution to mediate between the rather blunt application 
of a valuation methodology based on the going concern value of the business 
and assets in what might be a depressed market and the problems inherent in 
moving towards the valuation approach more commonly adopted in the 
United States (using professional valuers, adopting valuation techniques 
such as discounted cash flow, to assess the “intrinsic” value of the business) 
may be to mandate that the parties must come to court for sanction (what a 
U.S. lawyer might call confirmation) of the scheme of arrangement with ev-
idence provided by the insolvency practitioner that they have entered into 
private bargaining, taking into account not only the apparent value in current 
market conditions but also the forecasts for the business. This could be bol-
stered by enhanced regulation setting out how the insolvency practitioner 
should approach the valuation mediation role and new legal rights which 
creditors could have to make representations to her. Indeed, some inspiration 
could be taken from the field of takeovers and the role of the independent 
adviser. The court would then ask the insolvency practitioner to report two 
things at sanction: first, that the insolvency practitioner is satisfied that the 
scheme has been arrived at following good faith private bargaining between 
the parties which took into account the forecasts for the business after the 
restructuring and, secondly, that if the scheme fails and the administrator is 
appointed, she will move down the hierarchy to para 3(1)(b) or (c) and no 
creditor is worse off under the scheme scenario than they would be in the 
counterfactual. Reform of this type would be limited, however, to large cor-
porate situations, and it would be important for the insolvency practitioner’s 
willingness to take on the role that any challenge to her opinion is dealt with 
before any final court sign-off on the plan. It is suggested here that a similar
approach could be adopted in the United States, with the introduction of 
mandatory bargaining replacing the hope that the structure of the Code will 
incentivise voluntary bargaining.
Further inspiration might also be drawn from the Canadian Companies’ 
Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) process (and a number of respondents 
highlighted this in their response to the English Insolvency Service consul-
tation). If a stay is ordered in CCAA proceedings, a monitor is appointed 
(and the court has discretion to order the appointment of a monitor in other 
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cases). Crucially, the court has discretion to direct the monitor to act as liai-
son with creditors.141 Like the English law administrator, the monitor is an 
officer of the court who can provide a dual function as the court’s officer in 
holding the ring in commercial discussions between the stakeholders and in 
reporting to the court. But unlike the English law administrator, she does not 
replace the company’s directors, and the company’s governance structure 
continues through the process. Janis Sarra has commented that, “[m]onitors 
increasingly navigate the debtor company through the complexity of the 
CCAA process, providing business judgment, negotiation skills and finan-
cial advice. The monitor can act as mediator or facilitator, bringing the par-
ties together in an effort to build consensus on a viable going forward 
business plan.”142 In developing this role for the monitor, the Canadian 
courts have consistently emphasised the need for the monitor to act inde-
pendently, and their repeated emphasis on this point appears to have been 
crucial in the perception of market players and trust in the monitor role.
V. CONCLUSION
At the heart of this Article lies the contention that the efficacy of bar-
gaining and litigation as a tool for determining valuation in a corporate debt 
restructuring depends on how it interacts with the rest of corporate bank-
ruptcy’s institutional structure. The Article has attempted to show how shifts 
in the organisation of the finance markets have led to significant shifts in 
informal norms of market behaviour. It argues that bargaining and litigation 
produces a fundamentally different result when it interacts with these new 
values, beliefs and informal rules of engagement. The Article tentatively 
suggests that this has implications for corporate bankruptcy law reform, per-
haps suggesting some form of mandated bargaining to replace a legal struc-
ture which was designed to incentivise it.
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